According to the Particularist Theory of Events, events are real things that have a spatiotemporal location. I argue that some events do not have a spatial location in the sense required by the theory. These events are ordinary, nonmental events like Smith’s investigating the murder and Carol’s putting her coat on the chair. I discuss the significance of these counterexamples for the theory.

Computer programs are used to obtain and store information about the online activities of users of the web. Many people are concerned about this practice because they believe that it can violate users' rights to privacy or result in violations of them. This belief is based on the assumption that the information obtained and stored with the use of the programs includes personal information. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this assumption is false. I discuss the (...) import of this result for computer ethics. If my thesis is correct, using the programs cannot violate a person's right to privacy and cannot result in violations of a right to privacy. Nevertheless it is prima facie morally wrong because, as I explain, it encourages people to perform actions that diminish the well-being of others. I discuss the implications of my thesis for the obligations of online businesses with regard to the relevant information. (shrink)

Each of the following sentences expresses a strong intuition about physical things: (a) a physical object is a three-dimensional spatial thing; (b) some physical things can, in the strict sense, remain the same thing through minor changes in their parts; (c) if x and y are physical things with the same spatiotemporal location, then x is strictly identical with y; (d) if x is a proper part of an existing physical thing and x occupies an occupiable region of space, then (...) x is itself an existing physical thing. There is a familiar argument that purports to prove that not all of (a)--(d) can be part of our ordinary concept of a physical thing. Its strategy for defending this claim is showing that at least one of (a)--(d) must-be false. The reason it gives for concluding that (a)--(d) are inconsistent is, appropriately, that they give rise to a paradox: according to the argument, (c) commits us to identifying products of a part-loss, yet (a), (b), and (d) yield the result that the products are different things. (shrink)